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Abstract— The Distributed Reflection Denial of Service 
(DRDoS) attack represents a critical security threat. As such 
attacks generate unidirectional traffic, it is difficult for the 
targets to protect themselves. To mitigate against such attacks, 
defense mechanisms must be installed on backbone networks, to 
detect and block the attack traffic before it reaches the final 
destination. Conventional approaches monitor the traffic volume, 
and assume that an attack is in progress if the observed volume 
exceeds a certain threshold. However, this simple approach 
allows the attacker to evade detection by adjusting the traffic 
volume. In this study, we proposed a novel approach that 
accurately detects DRDoS attacks using the time intervals 
between the arriving packets. We applied a K-means clustering 
algorithm to identify the appropriate threshold value. The 
proposed algorithm was implemented at a real data center, and 
the results demonstrated the high level of accuracy that our 
approach can achieve. 
 
Index Terms—DDoS, DRDoS, NTP, Time interval, K-means 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks pose a severe 
security threat. Distributed Reflection Denial of Service 
(DRDoS) is a sophisticated form of DDoS that makes use of 
open servers. There are four prominent types of DRDoS attack, 
using the protocols CharGen, DNS, NTP, and SSDP [1]. When 
these User Datagram Protocol (UDP)-based attacks are 
generated by DDoS as-a-service, they are known as Booters 
[2]. 
Several mitigation techniques are available. Li et al. report 
that cloud services may be used as botnets [3], allowing 
attackers to expand the scale of the attack at a low cost, and 
propose a defense called srcTrace. Arbor Networks offers a 
Peak Flow SP for service providers that monitors huge 
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amounts of backbone traffic to detect malicious packets [4]. 
These approaches assume that malicious packets will have a 
large traffic volume. In reality, however, some attacks may not 
be easy to detect by measuring traffic volumes. For example, 
the packet size of an HTTP GET request is small, while the 
response from the Web server is lengthy [5]. The UDP query 
packets that invoke DRDoS attacks are also small. 
In this study, we proposed a novel approach to detecting 
DRDoS attacks that use small packets. The key is the leverage 
of time interval analysis. The proposed method compares the 
time intervals between packets. After removing outliers, it then 
calculates a threshold value and applies a K-means clustering 
algorithm to the time intervals. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II 
describes the mechanism and introduces the terminology of 
DDoS and DRDoS attacks. Section III discusses those existing 
methods that are relevant to the current study. In Section IV, 
we set out our goals. The proposed method is described in 
Section V. Section VI reports on an evaluation of the novel 
method, carried out in a data center. Some further issues are 
explored in Section VII, and our conclusions are presented in 
Section VII. 
II. DDOS AND DRDOS ATTACKS 
In Q4 of 2016, DRDoS attacks occurred more frequently 
than SYN Flood attacks. Table I shows examples of DRDoS 
attacks, which are characterized by their large traffic volume. 
In 2014, NTP amplification attacks attracted attention because 
of their catastrophic traffic volumes while using normal NTP 
servers, which are open to the Internet. 
Figure 1 shows the mechanism of a DRDoS attack. These 
use UDP packets such as CharGen, DNS, NTP, or SSDP. Such 
protocols have longer size responses, compared with the short 
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TABLE I 





Mar. 2013 DNS 300 
May 2013 DNS 167 
Feb. 2014 NTP 400 
Aug. 2015 RPC 100 
 
 queries. The packet size is amplified by the reflector. For 
example, the monlist command of the NTP protocol replies to a 
query with the communication history for, at most, 600 devices. 
This offers a convenient tool for attackers who prefer 
packet-size amplification. Servers that reply to queries from 
the Internet are called reflectors. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Mechanism of DRDoS attacks. 
 
The attacker sends malicious queries to these reflectors 
while spoofing the source IP address as that of a victim. The 
reflector then unwittingly returns large-scale responses to that 
address. 
A large number of reflectors exist worldwide, most of which 
are improperly configured or use a default setting. Several 
organizations attempt to identify vulnerable servers on the 
Internet, then notify their administrators [10]. 
III. RELATED WORKS 
A DRDoS attack works in two ways. A huge number of 
packets may be generated, occupying the entire bandwidth of 
certain communication links. This can be detected by 
measuring the traffic volumes across the links. This detection 
method is implemented using an IDS (Intrusion Detection 
System), in which an alarm is triggered if a traffic threshold is 
exceeded. 
A second DRDoS attack type uses a small query packet that 
is answered by a longer reply packet. If the number of query 
packets is large, the computational resources of a server, 
including memory, CPU, or process tables, may be 
overwhelmed. This form of attack is difficult to detect by 
measuring traffic volumes. 
Our earlier work, reported in [11], analyzed the time 
intervals between DRDoS packets, and covered the CharGen, 
DNS, NTP, and SSDP protocols. These time intervals were 
used to characterize each attack. The current study extended 
this approach by applying a clustering method to discriminate 
between DRDoS attacks and normal communications. 
Hayashi et al. proposed a time interval analysis-based method 
for mitigating HTTP GET request flood attacks on backbone 
networks [12]. Their approach used two threshold parameters, 
𝑇𝑡ℎ and 𝐷𝑡ℎ. If two packets arrive at the server within a time 
𝑇𝑡ℎ, they are assumed to be successive (see Figure 2). If the 
series of successive packets has a longer duration than 𝐷𝑡ℎ, it is 
treated as suspicious. However, no specific values for 𝑇𝑡ℎ and 
𝐷𝑡ℎ were given. In this study, a novel method was proposed for 
determining the values of 𝑇𝑡ℎ and 𝐷𝑡ℎ. The approach was then 
implemented in a data center to detect DRDoS attacks and 
assess its performance.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Packets judged to be successive.  
 
Li et al. [3] used the entropy of a network flow to detect an 
attacking flow. This assumes that the transmission rate of an 
attack flow will be larger than that of a legitimate flow. The 
current study did not assume this. Instead, the analysis was 
based only on the interval between the arrival times of packets. 
IV. PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED 
A. Environment of a Data Center 
The configuration of the data center implementation is 
shown as Figure 3. This center has its own AS number. The 
edge router forwards packets between the outside AS and the 
inside AS. 
 
Fig. 3. Configuration of the observation point. 
 
The packets were observed at a certain sampling rate by the 
edge router. Before data analysis, the source IP and destination 
IP addresses were anonymized using a hash algorithm, to 
protect the privacy of the information. Only the headers of the 
packets were observed. Observations were conducted over the 
period from November 9, 2016 to December 11, 2016. 
The packets were represented in 5-tuple flow format (src_IP, 
dst_IP, src_port, dst_port, protocol). Sampling was conducted 
randomly, at a rate of ten flows per hour. The key data were the 
packet lengths and the intervals between packet arrivals. Flows 
whose UDP source ports were numbered 17, 19, 53, 111, 123, 
137, 161, 1900, 3000, and 27960 were picked up, forming the 
UDP Port list. These ports are widely used in DRDoS attacks. 
We also picked up flows through TCP source port 80, as these 
are sent by Web servers. Potentially abnormal flows were 
identified by combining the source port number and the 
destination port number, as shown in Table II. 
 Table III gives a breakdown of the observed flows used in 
the study. While UDP flows were also observed, these 
non-NTP packets were rare. Our analysis therefore focused on 
the NTP flows. 
B. Preliminary Investigation 
Since our analysis is based on the time intervals between 
incoming packets in a flow, the distribution of time intervals is 
important. Figure 4 shows the time intervals, organized by the 
range shown in Table IV. Significant differences were 
observed. Note that the Y-axis of Figure 4 uses a logarithmic 
scale, and each value differs by at least one order of magnitude 
from the next. The wide range of time intervals can be seen, 
and at least five groups could be distinguished. However, it 
was not clear whether this division by digits was appropriate. 
We therefore applied a K-means algorithm to the packet 
intervals to form more robust clusters when n equaled five. 
 
Fig. 4. Packet intervals grouped by five conditions. 
C. Identifying a Suspicious Flow 
The goal of the study was to propose a new method for 
discriminating between abnormal and normal flows. The 
output was therefore labeled either Suspicious or 
Non-suspicious. The possible outcomes are shown in Table V. 
Our proposed method identifies a flow as suspicious if the 
time between successive packets in the flow exceeds a certain 
threshold. We discuss the determination of this value in the 
following section. 
The proposed method does not use the port numbers to 
judge whether a sequence of packets is suspicious, because 
new protocols or port numbers may be used at some future date, 
allowing attacks to resume. Instead, our method uses only the 
time interval between arriving packets. 
V. PROPOSED METHOD 
The proposed method has three steps, as shown in Figure 5. In 
step one, outlier values are removed from each flow. In step 
two, the packet intervals in each flow are classified. In step 
three, the threshold value indicating a suspicious flow is 
derived. 
 
Fig. 5. Flow Chart of the proposed method. 
 
A. STEP 1: Removal of outliers 
Outliers may exist in a flow that contains a pause. For 
example, an attacker may intentionally insert a long pause 
between certain packets to evade detection. Such outliers 
would constitute noise when calculating the threshold values 
TABLE II 
DEFINITION OF ABNORMAL FLOWS BY PORT NUMBERS. 
 
Src            Dst 80 UDP Port List Over 49151 
80  Abnormal Normal 
UDP Port List Abnormal  Normal 
 
TABLE III 
BREAKDOWN OF OBSERVED FLOWS. 
 
             Normal Abnormal Total 
NTP flow 3,640 14 3,654 
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1 i < 0.1𝑠  
2 0.1s ≤ i < 1𝑠 
3 1s ≤ i < 10𝑠 
4 10s ≤ i < 100𝑠 
5 100s ≤ i 
 
 in step two. Any outliers were therefore removed, using the 
ChangeFinder algorithm [14] shown in Figure 6. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Two-phase learning process of the ChangeFinder algorithm. 
 
ChangeFinder applies two phase learning. First, input data 
are analyzed using the Autoregressive (AR) model, then the 
sequentially discounting AR model (SDAR) learning is 
applied. The AR model is given by Equation (1) where 𝑦𝑡  is 
the data on the packet intervals, 𝑎𝑖 is the AR coefficient, o is 
the order, and w is white noise, which follows a distribution 
whose average is zero. ChangeFinder learns the probability 
density 𝑃𝑡, of the packet intervals x𝑡 by applying the SDAR 
algorithm, then calculates the outlier scores m( 𝑥𝑡 ) using 
Equation (2). 
 m(𝑥𝑡)  =  −log 𝑝𝑡−1(𝑥𝑡|𝑥
𝑡−1) (2) 
Here, 𝑝𝑡−1(𝑥𝑡|𝑥
𝑡−1) is the conditional density function of 
𝑥𝑡 against the stochastic process p, and 𝑥
𝑡−1 is the series (𝑥1, 
𝑥2 , … 𝑥𝑡−1 ). The scores indicate the degree of separation 
between the values predicted by the AR model and x𝑡. The AR 
model mainly assumes stationary data, so an important feature 
of ChangeFinder is its ability to handle non-stationary data by 
applying the SDAR algorithm. Figure 7 shows how 
ChangeFinder detects outliers in the data. These outlier scores 
are normalized regardless of the data range. In this study, we 




Fig. 7. Packet intervals and outlier scores. 
 
B. STEP 2: Clustering by K-means 
The K-means clustering algorithm [16] was used to 
discriminate between successive packet sequences from the 
terminated packet sequences. The two threshold values, 𝑇𝑡ℎ 
and 𝐷𝑡ℎ, were determined in Step 3. The K-means algorithm 
attempts to minimize the value of Equation (3):  
 
 
Here, 𝐶𝑖  (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛) represents a cluster, n is the number of 
clusters, x is an element in the cluster, and µ𝑖 is the centroid of 
the cluster. The K-means algorithm selects an appropriate µ𝑖 
for each cluster, in order to minimize the value of Equation (3). 
We used the K-means algorithm in the scikit-learn package 
[18], and applied it to each normal and abnormal flow. 
Each cluster was ranked in ascending order, based on its 
maximum interval. The values Q, R, and U in Table VI were 
then calculated for each cluster, and the value of U used to 
compare the clusters. When calculating Q, we rounded off the 
packet interval time to two decimal places. 
The cluster whose U value (=Q×R) is largest is likely to 
include a large number of intervals between successive packets. 
Li [3] noted an apparent difference between short packet 
intervals and long ones. Our observations confirmed this. 
 
Fig. 8. Example distribution of packet intervals in different clusters. 
 
Within a flow there are five clusters, each of which is a set of 
packet intervals. Figure 8 shows a distribution graph (CDF) of 
the packet intervals, in which gradient lines connect the points 
at CDF values of 0.1 and 0.9. In the example, there are five 
distribution graphs of packet intervals for each cluster, with 
different gradients. Combining all the flows and plotting the 
CDFs and gradients produced Figure 9, in which the 






















DESCRIPTION OF VALUES FOR DETECTION. 
 
Values Description 
Q Maximum value of the number of duplicated 
packet intervals in the cluster 
R Total number of packet intervals in the cluster 
U Q × R 
 
  
Fig. 9. Distribution of gradients of all flows. 
 
The gradient line is steep if the distribution of packet 
intervals is concentrated. As shown in Figure 9, the CDF of 
cluster 1 for both normal and suspicious flows was larger than 
the CDF of the merged clusters 2, 3, 4, and 5. This suggested 
that shorter packet intervals were concentrated. However, 
longer packet intervals were also present. Cluster 1 was 
therefore assumed to include a large number of packet 
intervals. However, as it was not clear that the same result 
could be seen in each flow, the value Q was used. 
Because short intervals were more numerous than large 
intervals, we adopted the value R, as can be seen from Figure 4. 
This showed that the majority of intervals were small. 
As noted above, successive intervals should be short. We 
named the cluster whose U was largest 𝐶𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐, and the cluster 
next to 𝐶𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐 , and whose maximum interval was larger, 𝐶𝑑 . 
This is shown in Figure 10. Most of the packet intervals in 𝐶𝑑 
were not successive. 
 
 
 Fig. 10. Examples of clusters and packet intervals. 
 
In Figure 10, interval 𝑖𝐸 is within 𝐶𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐. Because 𝐶𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐 has 
the largest U, 𝑖𝐸 is a successive interval, whereas 𝑖𝐹 is within 
𝐶𝑑, and it is non-successive. 
 
C. STEP 3: Determining the values 
To detect suspicious flows, the optimal threshold Dth must 
be found. 
1) Longest interval time 𝑇𝑡ℎ for successive packets 
We set 𝑇𝑡ℎ to the maximum packet interval time in cluster 
𝐶𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐. This threshold value was used in (2). 
2) Formation of successive packet sequences 
For each flow, we collected all the interval times from 
cluster 1 to 𝐶𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐 . For each flow, we formed a successive 
sequence of packets that fell within the maximum interval time 
𝑇𝑡ℎin (1). We then calculated the total duration of a sequence 
as the sum of the successive arrival times. For a normal flow, 
we used all successive sequences. For an abnormal flow, we 
used the maximum successive arrival time. 
3) Fix 𝐷𝑡ℎ 
Finally, we calculated the distribution of successive 
duration times of the normal and abnormal flows, represented 
in the CDFs. The optimal time 𝐷𝑡ℎ is given when Equation (4) 
takes the maximum value. 
 𝐶𝐷𝐹(𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒)
− 𝐶𝐷𝐹(𝑎𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒) 
(4) 
The proposed method uses the derived value of 𝐷𝑡ℎ as the 
threshold for detecting a suspicious flow. If the time between 
successive packets equals or exceeds this threshold, an 
abnormal flow is suspected. 
VI. EVALUATION 
A. Threshold Value: 𝐷𝑡ℎ 
 To evaluate our method, the proposed method was applied 
to the equipment in a data center, as shown in Figure 3. The 
algorithm produced a threshold value of 𝐷𝑡ℎ  =  4.0 sec. 
B. Performance of the proposed method 
Figure 11 shows the results. These follow the ground truth 
of flows defined by port numbers from Table II, in which an 
abnormal flow has the source port number 80 (HTTP) and a 
destination port number 123 (NTP) or a source port number 
123 (NTP) and the destination port number 80 (HTTP). Table 
VII shows the outcomes, where S is the time between the 
arrival of successive packets in the real traffic. The True 
Positive rate (TP) was 100%, and the False Positive rate (FP), 
while not zero, was low at 5%. For the analyzed packets, most 
flows were normal. If a high (FP) were found, extra resources 
would be needed to investigate those suspicious flows that turn 
out to be normal.  
 
Fig. 11. Distribution of duration times. 
  
VII. DISCUSSION 
A.  Effect of outlier removal 
When the outlier values were not removed, different results 
were produced. Using the same threshold value of 𝐷𝑡ℎ = 4.0, 
the FP rate rose to 14.2%. Figure 12 shows the results without 
removal of the outliers. It can be seen that the performance was 
inferior to that reported in Figure 12, demonstrating the 
effectiveness of outlier removal. 
 
 
Fig. 12. Distribution of interval times. 
  
Fig. 13. Distribution of packet sizes across all sampled flows. 
 
B. Observed packet sizes 
In the Introduction, we noted that the UDP query packets 
used to invoke DRDoS attacks are small. Figure 13 shows the 
distribution of packet sizes across all sampled flows in the data 
center. This demonstrates that there exists no threshold value 
that allows normal HTTP packets to be distinguished from 
NTP attacks based on packet size alone. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
This study proposed a practical method for detecting 
DRDoS attacks by analyzing the time intervals between the 
arrival timestamps of packets. Threshold values were 
determined after outlier removal, using a K-means clustering 
algorithm. 
An evaluation experiment demonstrated that our proposed 
method is superior to the conventional DRDoS detection 
method, based on measurement of traffic volume. 
This study addressed only the NTP protocol. In future work, 
we will investigate DRDoS attacks using other protocols, 
including CharGen, DNS, and SSDP. 
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